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1. Introduction 
Process industry brings economic activity and provides us with unique materials. While 
mankind grows in numbers, needs are at the increase and while natural resources become 
more scarce, process industry is even more needed to provide for energy and energy 
carriers, fertilizers, plastics, fibres, coatings, pharmaceuticals to name a few, and even clean 
water. At the down side there is an always looming risk of accident, loss of containment of 
hazardous substances and the ensuing hazards of explosions, fires and toxic spread. This 
creates a background threat to workers and when risks have effect outside plants to the 
general population. Since for several reasons industry favours locations near crossways of 
trade and traffic and thus vicinity to population is inevitable, risk assessment has in many 
places become a routine based on legislation. Risk assessment as an instrument to describe 
and delimit the risk of chemical process operations was introduced to the community of 
Loss Prevention in the process industry in the mid-seventies. Much has been written about it 
since that time and considerable investments made in developing methodology, release and 
dispersion models, as well as ways to predict damage. Many data have been collected and 
much has been said about interpretation of results. The latter has been an infinite source of 
quarrels. Meanwhile, the use of risk assessment has become rather widespread and more 
decision making depends on it. Not only installations bound to a certain location, but also 
transportation routes have been object of risk analysis and assessment. Yet, the methodology 
produces results which in a number of aspects are still unsatisfactory. To mention an aspect 
the variance of outcomes of an analysis for example is high and can cover in some cases two 
orders of magnitude in risk defined as the product of expected event frequency and likely 
damage (Pasman et al., 2008, 2009).  
Apart from having doubts about the magnitude of remaining risk, there is the question why 
despite the large body of experience still major accidents happen. In process industry 
progress in maintaining safety has been impressive. Statistic figures on personal safety of 
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workers have fallen over 40 years in a steady rate. Yet, from time to time, high loss process 
incidents keep on occurring. This paper will start off presenting a statistical study on 
petrochemical accidents over a long period of evidence underpinning the need of 
developing and sufficiently strengthening control barriers to prevent catastrophic 
consequences to people or environment resulting from accidental releases of hydrocarbons. 
It will present some results extracted from a data base on the main categories of causes. It 
will then pay attention to human performance with respect to safety. Human decisions and 
acts in management, design, construction, and operation of plant have a large influence on 
safety. Qualitative and quantitative assessments should cover the human/machine 
interface, operating and emergency procedures, and training. Unfortunately, human 
performance factors do not always find systematically its way as input into facility design, 
development of operating procedures, or operator training. Also underlying economic and 
organizational processes have large influence as recently described by Knegtering and 
Pasman (2009). Cost pressure, aging, work force turnover and failing safety management 
play an important role and have an adverse effect on culture. This weakens the resilience of 
an organization. 
The paper will continue describing what is meant with risk assessment, where it is used for 
and why and what trends can be seen. It will briefly summarise experiences in various 
countries. It will then try to analyse the underlying problems as there are the subjectivity in 
hazard identification, oversimplification in release models, assumptions in environmental 
conditions (weather, terrain), the large uncertainties in technical failure mechanisms and 
failure rates, and the deficiencies in consequence modelling and in view of the above about 
organization and Human Factor the effects of failures of safety management system. It will 
try to formulate how to go ahead. 
 
2. Accidents in the oil industry 
Investigating and analyzing the origins and consequences of accidents over a long period in 
a given industrial sector, in connection with proper statistical evaluation, can provide 
lessons on how to improve assessment and management of risk. In fact, historical analysis 
leads to the identification of the most probable scenarios (e.g. release, fire, explosion etc.) 
including consequences, as well as to the identification of the most frequent immediate or 
direct and underlying or root causes. Where safety improvement based on accident analysis 
is mainly addressed via quantification of lagging indicators as lost time injury frequency, 
the statistical approach can also be useful in identifying key indicators which on an industry 
wide basis better resolve the nature of incidents. Accidents that are considered in this 
section are taken from the TNO FACTS Database (TNO), which includes accident data from 
a number of countries starting from the beginning of the twentieth century. We focused our 
attention on the downstream oil industry sector for which accidents, connected to both 
personal and process safety, represent an area of significant concerns. By the way to put 
things in perspective, some measures evidence that in 2004 oil and gas workers were six 
times more likely to die from a fall than from an explosion/burn (OGP, 2005). We analyzed 
a time period starting from the early 1930s to 2008, during which 1209 events are identified. 
Distribution of accidents according to time, by natural decades, is depicted in Figure 1, 
showing a jump followed by a slower increasing trend in the last four decades after much 
power and chemical industry became oil based.  
The distribution is to be attributed both to the improvement of accident information 
availability and to the increase of oil product consumption and corresponding development 
of the downstream oil industry.  
Considering in detail the last three decades, (see Fig. 2) accident trend from statistical 
viewpoint is not a monotonic one, but evidences upswing and drop, which contrarily to 
other industrial sectors cannot be correlated to production rate (expressed as million barrel 
per day). Traditional lagging indicators (i.e. measures of outcomes and occurrences) are 
determined for a work unit. They include lost time accident frequency (e.g. eq. 1), total 
accident frequency index (e.g. eq. 2), fatal accident frequency index (e.g. eq. 3); high 
potential incident frequency; worker compensation expressed as percentage of payroll; 
property damage costs; loss of hydrocarbon containment; etc. They can provide historical 
trends in safety performance for a certain location or work unit useful for highlighting 
appropriate opportunities and priorities for safety improvement.  
 
 610Number of  hours absent from workLTI Number of  worked hours  (1) 
 
 610Number of  total accidentsFI Number of  worked hours  (2) 
 
 810Number of  fatalitiesFAFR Number of  worked hours  (3) 
 
Leading indicators on the other hand try to detect trends in potential ‘precursors’ and in 
safety culture. For a further overview and definitions, see CCPS, 2008. These indicators on 
the basis of hours worked will not be pursued here; instead we shall develop a picture for 
the oil downstream industrial sector as a whole. It is interesting to analyze statistics on the 
severity of recorded accidents, again going decades back to the middle of the twentieth 
century, based on total number of fatalities and total number of injured people in the sector. 
 
From Fig. 3, it can be observed that in the last three decades, the number of fatality 
evidences shows a decreasing trend, while the number of injured people increases 
continuously from the fifties onward reaching a maximum by the end of the 20th century. It 
seems that in this sector the most effective actions in preventing casualties result in less fatal 
accidents, while the general improvement in process industrial practice and automation has 
lower effect on  injuries. 
The classification of each accident was done elaborating a structured scheme based on the 
approach of EU MARS (Major Accident Reporting System) reports and considering three 
macro-categories, namely Organization, Plant/process and Environment. Under the 
headline Plant/process are grouped the possible causative factors directly connected to 
hardware and inherent characteristics of the process (see Fig. 4). The area Organization 
collects causative factors related to human factors at different levels and to the safety 
management system and safety culture (see Fig. 5). Under the headline Environment were 
included natural events, domino effects, items related to work place lay-out, machine safety, 
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play an important role and have an adverse effect on culture. This weakens the resilience of 
an organization. 
The paper will continue describing what is meant with risk assessment, where it is used for 
and why and what trends can be seen. It will briefly summarise experiences in various 
countries. It will then try to analyse the underlying problems as there are the subjectivity in 
hazard identification, oversimplification in release models, assumptions in environmental 
conditions (weather, terrain), the large uncertainties in technical failure mechanisms and 
failure rates, and the deficiencies in consequence modelling and in view of the above about 
organization and Human Factor the effects of failures of safety management system. It will 
try to formulate how to go ahead. 
 
2. Accidents in the oil industry 
Investigating and analyzing the origins and consequences of accidents over a long period in 
a given industrial sector, in connection with proper statistical evaluation, can provide 
lessons on how to improve assessment and management of risk. In fact, historical analysis 
leads to the identification of the most probable scenarios (e.g. release, fire, explosion etc.) 
including consequences, as well as to the identification of the most frequent immediate or 
direct and underlying or root causes. Where safety improvement based on accident analysis 
is mainly addressed via quantification of lagging indicators as lost time injury frequency, 
the statistical approach can also be useful in identifying key indicators which on an industry 
wide basis better resolve the nature of incidents. Accidents that are considered in this 
section are taken from the TNO FACTS Database (TNO), which includes accident data from 
a number of countries starting from the beginning of the twentieth century. We focused our 
attention on the downstream oil industry sector for which accidents, connected to both 
personal and process safety, represent an area of significant concerns. By the way to put 
things in perspective, some measures evidence that in 2004 oil and gas workers were six 
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ergonomics and other environmental conditions. According to this framework, starting from 
the direct cause of the accident, it is possible to analyze the accident histories deeper 
(provided that adequate data are available) in order to identify two/three underlying causes 
in a sort of causal logic chain that, for example links a direct cause under Plant/process to 
more distant causes within the heading Organization. 
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Fig. 1. Global total number of accidents in the downstream oil industry per decade recorded 
in the TNO FACTS data base. 
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Fig. 2. Oil production over the last few decades and number of accidents. 
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Fig. 3. Casualties (fatalities and injured persons) per decade found in Database FACTS 
recorded industrial accidents. 
 
The distribution of the entries among the three main categories evidences that in the 
downstream oil industry Plant/process cause accounts for 64.8 % of total accidents, 
Organization for 28.8% and, at last, Environment for the remaining 6.4 %.  
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 Fig. 5. Distribution of accident causes within the category Organization. 
 
The distribution of the main direct causes is depicted in Figures 4 and 5, respectively for 
Plant/process and Organization, corresponding to the two items that globally cover more 
93.6 % of the accidents. Under each heading three sub-steps were identified as possible 
underlying cause (recalling the complete classification scheme), allowing evidence to 
possible deficiencies in the safety management system or in the safety culture of the 
company.  
 
Dealing with the category Organization (see Fig. 5), it appears that more than 50 % of the 
accidents can be connected to a form of human error: the analysis shows worker error 
(unsafe act) to be a significant direct cause as well as a root cause during design stage, 
operation, and management of the plants, the so-called latent failures. Remarkably, accident 
analysis as mentioned before revealed that both immediate and root causes are often 
interacting in parallel and/or in series among multiple, interdependent elements in the 
complex, high hazard context of a refinery. This has already been concluded in general by 
Professor James Reason in his many publications, e.g. Reason, 1997 and embodied in his so-
called Swiss Cheese concept. It does not help to make risk assessment an easy job! 
 
Accidents can be divided into classes according to the number of fatalities per accident. 
Although information is not available for all accidents that occurred, it can be assumed that 
the sample taken here is statistically significant. Data on accidents with fatalities can then be 
elaborated as suggested by Oggero et al., 2007 obtaining curves in a way similar to societal 
risk f/N. Calculated is the (relative) probability of occurrence of an accident class exceeding 
a given number of fatalities, normalized by the total number of accidents involving at least 
one fatality observed in the sector over a certain period. The cumulative probability data are 
plotted as a function of the given number of deaths of each class: 
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where:    N  is the lower limit number of deaths in a class (x -axis); 
 i  is class number; 
P(x  ≥ N) = Fj  is the probability of an accident class j in which the number of deaths 
will be ≥ N (y-axis); 
 n  is the total number of classes; 
 i  is the number of accident entries for a given class i. 
 
Figure 6 shows the cumulative probability of accidents with N or more fatalities as a 
function of N, in the downstream oil industry, obtained on the basis of all selected 
worldwide accidents and plotted on a log-log axis diagram.  
 
 
Fig. 6. Cumulative probability of an accident with N or more fatalities as a function of N for 
all accidents with fatalities in the downstream oil industry (TNO database FACTS entries 
over the time period 1938-2008). 
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 Fig. 7. Cumulative probability of an accident with N or more fatalities as a function of N for 
all accidents with fatalities in the downstream oil industry, within the category 
Plant/process (TNO Database FACTS entries over the time period 1938-2008). 
 Fig. 8. Cumulative probability of an accident with N or more fatalities as a function of N for 
all accidents with fatalities in the downstream oil industry, within the category Organization 
(TNO Database FACTS entries over the time period 1938-2008). 
As shown in the same figure, the best-fit provides a P=Nb curve type, with 95% confidence 
limits, (r2 = 0.995) yielding b = -1.037. This finding means that the probability of an accident 
involving ten or more deaths is about 11 times higher than the one of an accident involving 
100 or more deaths. By selecting entries in the two items accounting for nearly all fatalities 
(Plant/process and Organization), we obtained the trends respectively shown in Figure 7 
and 8. 
  
According to this elaboration, based on the concept of cumulative probability of fatal 
accidents, it can be argued that the consequences in terms of human harm of an oil refinery 
accident are likely to be  more severe, when the accident is  primarily connected to a cause in 
the category Plant/process, rather than in the category Organization.  
 
It is interesting applying the same approach to a specific major hazard activity within the oil 
industry, namely storage. The statistical elaboration over the same time period allowed 
obtaining the graph depicted in Fig. 9. The best-fit yields a value b=-0.835, indicating that 
the consequence of an accidents connected to storage activity is significantly higher than the 
average for all downstream oil activities. This may have to do with the relative large 
quantities of hazardous material involved in storage accidents. 
 
It is amply recognized that the ultimate goal of industrial accident analysis is the generation 
of lessons learned in order to avoid accident recurrence; however, events having the 
potential of inducing hazardous situations though not materializing after all – the so-called 
near misses-, can also contribute to the corporate learning and memory (ESReDA, 2001). The 
challenge of improving the organizational memory and the need for a new look at the sort 
of injury and accident data that are collected, was already highlighted by Kletz (1993). 
Problems in actually analyzing case histories have been described by Pasman (2009). In this 
context shall be mentioned that examination of statistics and causes of minor injuries, 
hazardous situations and in particular of near-misses can prove even more challenging but 
also more fruitful with respect to extraction of experience because it is based on an higher 
frequency of occurrence (see also Körvers et al., 2010). In fact, injury and fatality statistics 
tend to reflect the quality of the organization in managing personal safety hazards, while 
near misses point more effectively to process safety hazards.  
 
For the purpose of learning lessons we developed a Near-miss reporting system (NMRS), 
suitable to trace back near-misses to possible deficiencies within the company under 
examination, including both human and organizational factors. As case-study, this 
framework was applied to categorize events directly collected in-the-field, over eight years 
observation, in a major downstream oil company.  
 
According to this approach, the immediate cause classification of near-misses was identified 
as schematically shown in Fig. 10. The distribution over the categories is roughly similar to 
the distribution observed earlier in accident causes. 
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100 or more deaths. By selecting entries in the two items accounting for nearly all fatalities 
(Plant/process and Organization), we obtained the trends respectively shown in Figure 7 
and 8. 
  
According to this elaboration, based on the concept of cumulative probability of fatal 
accidents, it can be argued that the consequences in terms of human harm of an oil refinery 
accident are likely to be  more severe, when the accident is  primarily connected to a cause in 
the category Plant/process, rather than in the category Organization.  
 
It is interesting applying the same approach to a specific major hazard activity within the oil 
industry, namely storage. The statistical elaboration over the same time period allowed 
obtaining the graph depicted in Fig. 9. The best-fit yields a value b=-0.835, indicating that 
the consequence of an accidents connected to storage activity is significantly higher than the 
average for all downstream oil activities. This may have to do with the relative large 
quantities of hazardous material involved in storage accidents. 
 
It is amply recognized that the ultimate goal of industrial accident analysis is the generation 
of lessons learned in order to avoid accident recurrence; however, events having the 
potential of inducing hazardous situations though not materializing after all – the so-called 
near misses-, can also contribute to the corporate learning and memory (ESReDA, 2001). The 
challenge of improving the organizational memory and the need for a new look at the sort 
of injury and accident data that are collected, was already highlighted by Kletz (1993). 
Problems in actually analyzing case histories have been described by Pasman (2009). In this 
context shall be mentioned that examination of statistics and causes of minor injuries, 
hazardous situations and in particular of near-misses can prove even more challenging but 
also more fruitful with respect to extraction of experience because it is based on an higher 
frequency of occurrence (see also Körvers et al., 2010). In fact, injury and fatality statistics 
tend to reflect the quality of the organization in managing personal safety hazards, while 
near misses point more effectively to process safety hazards.  
 
For the purpose of learning lessons we developed a Near-miss reporting system (NMRS), 
suitable to trace back near-misses to possible deficiencies within the company under 
examination, including both human and organizational factors. As case-study, this 
framework was applied to categorize events directly collected in-the-field, over eight years 
observation, in a major downstream oil company.  
 
According to this approach, the immediate cause classification of near-misses was identified 
as schematically shown in Fig. 10. The distribution over the categories is roughly similar to 
the distribution observed earlier in accident causes. 
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 Fig. 9. Cumulative probability of an accident with N or more fatalities as a function of N for 
all accidents with fatalities, related to storage activity in the downstream oil industry (TNO 
Database FACTS entries over the time period 1938-2008). 
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 Fig. 10. Near miss classification within the NMRS framework, recorded over an 8-year 
period in a downstream oil company. 
 
Further analysis can maximize the benefits of a near miss reporting system. Among them, 
we can mention (CCPS, 2008): 
 the utilization of process safety near misses in connection with process safety 
lagging indicators to build up a process safety performance Heinrich pyramid; 
 the evaluation of process safety near misses considering the potential as well as the 
actual consequences of the event; 
 the establishment of ties between the near miss data and the deficient management 
system, so as to drive system improvement from near miss as well as from actual 
incidents.  
 
As shown in Fig. 11, an effort was made to identify top ranking direct causes of near-misses 
over a prolonged period: the knowledge of how frequently these categories are involved in 
potential accidents can help in improving safety performance. In addition, for every near-
miss it is important to conduct a complete root cause analysis while keeping in mind the 
question why that cause could be present. Component failure or malfunction appeared to be 
the top cause. However, it must be underlined that the near-miss reporting system 
evidenced again in several events a combination of root causes.  
 
0,00 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00 12,00 14,00 16,00
IMP 02 Components failure/ malfunction
IMP 06 Loss of containment from pipeline
ORG 16 Denial of procedures and rules
ORG 10 Inappropriate/ inadequate installation
IMP 04 Corrosion, fatigue, wear
IMP 01 Failure/ damage to reactors, vessels, equipment
ORG 13 Inadequate inspection
ORG 12 Maintenance
ORG 11 Insufficient isolation of equipment
IMP 05 Failure/ malfunction of equipment and control system
ORG 09 Unsuitability of manifacturing/ construction
ORG 14 Worker error
AMB 05 Utility breakdown
IMP 10 Loading and unloading operations of road tankers/ barge
IMP 03 Loss of process control
 Fig. 11. Top fifteen immediate causes of near-misses (percentage of the entire number of 
entries) recorded in a downstream oil company over an eight-year period. 
 
3. Some considerations on the human factor 
The investigation on many high profile accidents across the process industry, confirmed by 
the statistical analysis previously outlined, concludes that different human failures can be 
identified as prominent amongst the root causes. Many of these can be ascribed to poor 
safety culture, or an inadequate safety management system. Safety culture is hard to 
precisely define although its absence can be sensed easily observing details in the execution 
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The investigation on many high profile accidents across the process industry, confirmed by 
the statistical analysis previously outlined, concludes that different human failures can be 
identified as prominent amongst the root causes. Many of these can be ascribed to poor 
safety culture, or an inadequate safety management system. Safety culture is hard to 
precisely define although its absence can be sensed easily observing details in the execution 
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of work. In the Culture Ladder training programme developed by Van der Graaf, Hudson et 
al. for Shell E&P, available at the website of the Energy Institute in London, the various 
stages of culture development are each characterized by a few pithy words (see Van der 
Graaf et al., 2002 and Hudson et al., 2004). In case leadership is serious about safety the 
organization will follow. The boss’ seriousness about safety is in fact what determines the 
safety attitude of the worker (Zohar,1980 and 2000). 
 
Human failures were categorised by HSE in the UK as either unintentional (error) or 
intentional by breaking of the rules (violation): the importance of its definition is connected 
to possible risk reduction by proper intervention. Generally speaking, the factors 
influencing accident frequency can be divided into following categories: 
 technical factors: low automation, multi-product industries, discontinuous operating 
cycles, and non-standardized production affect safety negatively, since they require a 
higher interaction between man and devices. On the other hand, a reduction in 
individual exposure to severe hazards was reported in case of the introduction of 
mechanized machinery and equipment in the mining (Asogwa, 1988) and the logging 
industry (Laflamme, 1988). 
 economical factors, e.g., the general economic climate (Saari, 1982), the unemployment 
rate, labour and social-insurance legislation, (Blank, 1996);  
 organization of the work, e.g., management system and performance monitoring, work 
practice, oversight, communication structure, etc.;  
 environmental conditions: about half of the general industrial accidents in Italy are 
related to conditions at the work place and they could be prevented by rather simple 
lay-out and protection measures, but in small companies their realization becomes 
extremely difficult, or even unfeasible because of operating, economic and/or space 
constraints (Fabiano et al., 2004); 
 human factors, both individual and inter-individual, e.g., workload, experience and 
training, competencies, fatigue, etc. 
Petrochemical and process industries experienced in the last two decades a substantial level 
of change in both terms of production globalization and in the way the business is 
structured. Current market conditions often make it necessary to apply outsourcing to 
remain competitive, particularly utilizing external and precarious human resources. In fact, 
in the last 20 years there has been a significant growth of workers in casual, part-time, 
subcontract or franchised arrangements, virtually in all OECD countries. Investigation of a 
possible relationship between personal and process accidents/near miss and temporary 
work was recently performed, adopting a questionnaire survey, for the definition of peculiar 
risk factors and for setting priorities to improve safety standards in this context. Data from 
the structured questionnaire were coded and entered into a database for subsequent 
multivariate analysis of variance (ANOVA).  
 
The independent variables, whose effects on the number of injuries and their severity were 
evaluated, included: worker age, job position, training period, on-site experience, temporary 
contract life, perceived accident cause. Significant results can be usefully analysed by 
adopting response surface methodology (RSM). An applicative example related to personal 
safety is depicted in graphical form in Figs. 12 and 13.  
 Fig. 12. Response surface for injury probability, as a function of training and on-site 
experience (Legend: a=less than 7 days; b=7-30 days; c=31-60 days; d=61-90 days; e=more 
than 90 days; r=less than 3 hours; s=3-5 hours; t=6-7 hours; u=more than 7 hours). (Fabiano 
et al., 2008). 
 
The significant interaction of the independent variables indicates that an increase of the 
training period (professional training and job tutoring) greatly reduces injury probability. 
Notwithstanding efforts by many consultants to train personnel, there is no substitute for a 
period spent within a process company to gain experience. It must be noted that safety 
programs include training as a part of the risk management process. However, 
implementation of rules followed-up by training may often not sufficiently reduce unsafe 
practices, as safety rules are often seen to apply only in certain situations and as being 
impossible to follow in the many exceptional situations which are seen to be the reality of 
the shop floor situation (Hale, 1990). Complacency, not seeing a risk or masculine pride not 
to fear a hazard plays also a role. 
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of work. In the Culture Ladder training programme developed by Van der Graaf, Hudson et 
al. for Shell E&P, available at the website of the Energy Institute in London, the various 
stages of culture development are each characterized by a few pithy words (see Van der 
Graaf et al., 2002 and Hudson et al., 2004). In case leadership is serious about safety the 
organization will follow. The boss’ seriousness about safety is in fact what determines the 
safety attitude of the worker (Zohar,1980 and 2000). 
 
Human failures were categorised by HSE in the UK as either unintentional (error) or 
intentional by breaking of the rules (violation): the importance of its definition is connected 
to possible risk reduction by proper intervention. Generally speaking, the factors 
influencing accident frequency can be divided into following categories: 
 technical factors: low automation, multi-product industries, discontinuous operating 
cycles, and non-standardized production affect safety negatively, since they require a 
higher interaction between man and devices. On the other hand, a reduction in 
individual exposure to severe hazards was reported in case of the introduction of 
mechanized machinery and equipment in the mining (Asogwa, 1988) and the logging 
industry (Laflamme, 1988). 
 economical factors, e.g., the general economic climate (Saari, 1982), the unemployment 
rate, labour and social-insurance legislation, (Blank, 1996);  
 organization of the work, e.g., management system and performance monitoring, work 
practice, oversight, communication structure, etc.;  
 environmental conditions: about half of the general industrial accidents in Italy are 
related to conditions at the work place and they could be prevented by rather simple 
lay-out and protection measures, but in small companies their realization becomes 
extremely difficult, or even unfeasible because of operating, economic and/or space 
constraints (Fabiano et al., 2004); 
 human factors, both individual and inter-individual, e.g., workload, experience and 
training, competencies, fatigue, etc. 
Petrochemical and process industries experienced in the last two decades a substantial level 
of change in both terms of production globalization and in the way the business is 
structured. Current market conditions often make it necessary to apply outsourcing to 
remain competitive, particularly utilizing external and precarious human resources. In fact, 
in the last 20 years there has been a significant growth of workers in casual, part-time, 
subcontract or franchised arrangements, virtually in all OECD countries. Investigation of a 
possible relationship between personal and process accidents/near miss and temporary 
work was recently performed, adopting a questionnaire survey, for the definition of peculiar 
risk factors and for setting priorities to improve safety standards in this context. Data from 
the structured questionnaire were coded and entered into a database for subsequent 
multivariate analysis of variance (ANOVA).  
 
The independent variables, whose effects on the number of injuries and their severity were 
evaluated, included: worker age, job position, training period, on-site experience, temporary 
contract life, perceived accident cause. Significant results can be usefully analysed by 
adopting response surface methodology (RSM). An applicative example related to personal 
safety is depicted in graphical form in Figs. 12 and 13.  
 Fig. 12. Response surface for injury probability, as a function of training and on-site 
experience (Legend: a=less than 7 days; b=7-30 days; c=31-60 days; d=61-90 days; e=more 
than 90 days; r=less than 3 hours; s=3-5 hours; t=6-7 hours; u=more than 7 hours). (Fabiano 
et al., 2008). 
 
The significant interaction of the independent variables indicates that an increase of the 
training period (professional training and job tutoring) greatly reduces injury probability. 
Notwithstanding efforts by many consultants to train personnel, there is no substitute for a 
period spent within a process company to gain experience. It must be noted that safety 
programs include training as a part of the risk management process. However, 
implementation of rules followed-up by training may often not sufficiently reduce unsafe 
practices, as safety rules are often seen to apply only in certain situations and as being 
impossible to follow in the many exceptional situations which are seen to be the reality of 
the shop floor situation (Hale, 1990). Complacency, not seeing a risk or masculine pride not 
to fear a hazard plays also a role. 
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Equally, it seems that staying of the worker on the same job site involves an increase of 
experience and knowledge of one’s duties, reducing the probability of an accident. In other 
words, even if employees are unaware initially of occupational risk, they can often acquire 
on-the-job experience. A key aspect is that, as reported by Asogwa (1988), an adaptation 
period is required for workers to perform adequately in new work assignments and a 
changed environment, while under conditions of pressure and intensified production (like 
those that usually correspond to the utilization of temporary workers) this training period is 
being reduced or eliminated. It must be underlined that the type of human failure influences 
the choice of the most effective intervention for their reduction. In fact, for violations or 
mistakes further training of operators may be most appropriate whereas for errors by skilled 
operators, improvement of the work environment or design of the man-machine interface is 
more likely to be effective (Ellis and Holt, 2009). 
 Fig. 13. Response surface plot of injury severity, as a function of training and on-site 
experience (Legend: a=less than 7 days; b=7-30 days; c=31-60 days; d=61-90 days; e=more 
than 90 days; r=less than 3 hours; s=3-5 hours; t=6-7 hours; u=more than 7 hours)  (Fabiano 
et al., 2008). 
 
In conclusion, remembering that "to err is human", human error must always be part of an 
effective training to shape a safety habit and must be considered in writing 
policy/procedures, so as to achieve maximum understanding and acceptance. It therefore 
also seems crucial to take human error into account when assessing risk.  
4. The advance of risk analysis application 
With the development of amongst others crude-oil based petrochemical industry in the late 
’60-ties of last century, large-scale chemical plants were built in areas with easy access to sea 
and inland waterways, mostly harbours, to enable transportation of feed stock and products 
and to find people to run the plants. After several catastrophic accidents, mostly explosions, 
but also fires and spread of toxic clouds safety concerns arose, which with rising prosperity 
and consciousness of people over time grew. Risk analysis as a methodology to describe and 
delimit the risk of chemical process operations was introduced in the mid-seventies to the 
then newly founded community of Loss Prevention in the process industry. The 
methodology borrowed from the nuclear industry, was seen by some as a panacea but 
initially stirred up endless discussions and controversy based on misunderstandings on 
contents of concepts and differences in definitions. Also, from the start there was an 
apparent dichotomy qualitative versus quantitative. In 1980 ‘human factor’ became an issue 
and with good reason many did not believe this could ever be quantified. Moreover a 
qualitative search for the hazards in a hazard identification step is indeed half the work. The 
HAZOP method to that end became immensely popular. Quantification is afflicted with 
uncertainties and where failure of components is stochastic, the determination of risk as a 
product of damage and likelihood requires a probabilistic approach. Some argued that in 
safety, where human life may be at stake, once a possibility of mishap was identified, an 
improvement to the process should be made or an additional safety measure installed. This 
however adds to the complexity and has its limits. On the other hand a large quantity of 
stored chemical as existed on quite some places after the scale-up of the industry in the ’60-
ties, forms an undeniable hazard potential. The protection of the public at large requires 
therefore safety distances to such risk source, which can extend to far outside the plant’s 
premises despite all safety measures taken. So, quantification of possible effects is a 
minimum requirement.  
However, over the years economic activity and habitation development needed more space, 
everywhere. As long as space is not a scarce item, safety distances work. Risk quantification 
can take into account preferential directional effects and weigh the chances of occurrence. 
This enables assessment of the risk versus the benefit of use of land. No wonder that in 
densely populated industrial areas as in The Netherlands risk analysis as a tool for land use 
planning and licensing of plant became so widespread.  
 
Quantification of effects had to be done anyhow, so in the second half of the’80-ties quite 
some countries initiated research projects to experimentally investigate and model so-called 
source terms: one- and two-phase outflow of pressurised or cryogenic liquid substances, 
evaporation of jets and pools formed on different substrates (water, soil), rain-out, 
dispersion of cold, dense clouds in time and space under different atmospheric conditions. 
Also radiation intensity of different kinds of fires (jet fire, pool fire, flashing flame, flame 
ball) was measured and modelled, vapour cloud explosions simulated and boiling liquid 
expanding vapour explosions (BLEVE) from a bursting tank with pressurised liquid heated 
by e.g. external fire investigated. The Research Directorate of the European Union got 
involved and the Europeans could do some cooperative work on gas dispersion and vapour 
cloud explosion that had body compared also with the field tests sponsored by the 
Department of Energy in the United States. In the early ’80-ties TNO assigned by the Dutch 
government, composed the series of ‘Coloured Books’, latest edition 2005, and developed 
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Scenario Calculated variable  EFFECTS 4 PHAST GASP EFFECTS 5.5 Mean value 
Standard 
deviation 
Toluene 
confined 
pool 
Max evaporation rate,
[kg s-1] 0.21 0.15 0.11 0.21 0.17 0.05 
Toluene 
unconfined 
pool 
Max evaporation  rate
[kg s-1] 3.5 1.2 1.1 3.5 2.3 1.4 
Max pool area [m2] 2005 995 1042 2000 1510 568 
LNG on 
water 
Max evaporation [kg s
1] 166 197-273 32-147 Avg. 169.5 164 78 
Max. pool area [m2] 387 1451-1520 804-1256 385 967 515 
Scenario Calculated variable STERAD PHAST Int-HSE EFFECTS 5.5 Mean value 
Standard 
deviation 
Two-phase 
jet fire 
Surface Emissive 
Power [kW m–2] 230 151 184 81 161 63 
Scenario Calculated variable DISPGAS PHAST PHAST 6.53.1 
EFFECTS 
5.5 
Mean 
value 
Standard 
deviation 
Dispersion 
dense gas 
(10%w/w H2S
Vertical max. 
distance to 100 ppm 
H2S, [m] 
625 275 205-380 367 (1695) 370 159 
 Horizontal max. 
dist. to 100 ppm 
H2S,  [m] 
150 205 215-400 372 268 111 
Table 2. Hazardous substance loss of containment effect calculations with various models. 
Some example outcomes from Ditali et al., 2006 with results added of TNO EFFECTS 5.5 
(TNO, 2007) 
 
Scenario, 
module 20x10x6 [m] 
Area of 
cloud to 
LFL [m2] 
DNV 
TDIM 
Method 
Area basis 
WS Atkins 
Method 
Area basis 
DNV 
TDIM 
Method 
Volume 
basis 
Cox, Lees 
and Ang 
Flow basis 
Hot work – 50 [h/y] 120 3.42  10-3 1.7  10-3 5.71  10-3 - 
Light equipment in process area.  
Very short contact time for gas to 
reach LFL 
120 3.24 10-3 5.8  10-2 3.24 10-3 2.44 10-2 
Light equipment in process area.  
Leak 1 kg/s    medium contact 
time  
3.6 9.72 10-5 1.8 10-3 1.05  10-5 1.56 10-2 
Light equipment in process area.  
Leak 0.1 kg/s   long contact time 0.04 1.08 10-5 2.1 10-4 3.33  10-7 3.56  10-3 
Heavy equipment in process area.  
Very short contact time for gas to 
reach LFL 
120 1.02 10-2 2.6 10-4 1.02 10-2 2.44 10-2 
Heavy equipment in process area. 
 Leak  1 kg/s medium contact 
time 
3.6 3.06 10-4 9  10-3 3.32  10-5 1.56 10-2 
Heavy equipment in process area. 
 Leak  0.1 kg/s  long contact time 0.04 3.40  10-5 1.1 10-5 1.05  10-6 3.56 10-3 
Table 3. Ignition probabilities assigned by different models to selected release scenarios. 
A key factor in QRA according to flammable release scenarios is connected to the selection 
of the ignition probability. The commonly applied approach based on correlating the 
ignition probability to the mass release rate may lead to unrealistic and very conservative 
estimates in many common plant situations. On the basis of a recent review by the Energy 
Institute (2006), a comparison among ignition probabilities assigned by various models to 
selected scenarios is presented in Table 3.  
It shows that the DNV method gives ignition probabilities from 20 to 30 times lower than 
the WS Atkins method, with the only exception of hot work ignition. Cox, Lees and Ang 
method, based on mass release rate, yields higher values than the other models, with the 
exception of scenario “heavy equipment, short contact time”. 
 
The afore mentioned is all but the effect of human error and of safety management system 
failures. Not only do these effects have an upward pushing effect on risk values but they 
contribute also significantly to the spread in results. On top of that comes that the effects 
cannot be measured simply. 
Summarising: choices, complexity, available computing time, limited knowledge and 
experience will contribute all to unavoidable spread. It will be clear that in case of land use 
planning or licensing the disagreement in model outcomes will cause much debate and 
friction amongst planners from both private and public parties. As to be expected there will 
be different interests hence providing fertile grounds for lawyers, while competent 
authorities under pressure become uncertain and will try to delay decision or eliminate the 
risk source and with that the activity. 
 
7. Future increase of demand and possible improvement 
Requirements tend to become more stringent. People will not tolerate risks ‘in their 
backyard’, but will foster on the other hand the economic activity process industry will 
bring. Quality of life of the European is much dependent on economic activity, while safety 
has a high priority. However, cities and traffic nodes expand also in the direction of 
established industry and the above mentioned group risk criterion cannot always be met. In 
view of the ever increasing scarcity of land this will happen in future more frequently. The 
latest Dutch legislation on public (external) safety requires an advice of the emergency 
response organisation (fire brigade). Since towns often expand in the direction of industrial 
sites, in case of license renewal this becomes a more general problem. On the basis of the 
advice the group risk requirement can be waived. The demand for advice is quite a burden 
on the fire brigades which traditionally had not the capability and knowledge level to 
perform risk analysis. At the same time as an emergency response organisation their 
mission is saving life. This will not only be that of casualties in the general public but also 
with respect to plant workers. Since the mayor of the city is responsible for a (regional) plan 
for disaster management, there is even more interest in prediction of injuries (number, 
nature, degree) than in only fatalities as in present risk analysis. Although probit data for 
injury by fire are available, those on injury by toxics and blast barely exist. 
Analysis of emergency response effectiveness is already needed for providing facilities in 
the area to exploit available capacity optimal. Emergency response is time sensitive though. 
A disaster develops usually progressively, so the effectiveness of the response operation 
depends on the time of arrival, deployment of emergency responders etc. relative to the 
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evolution of the scenario. Moreover the development of the threat in time and space 
determines the possibilities of self-rescue and evacuation. Hence analysis for emergency 
response unlike the present scenarios for a risk analysis would have to be developed with 
time functions while one would also be interested in the close-in scenario rather than in the 
far-field. As a risk analysis for a plant can encompass many tens to hundreds of scenarios it 
is pretty obvious that for scenario analysis a selection has to be made. However what criterion 
can be used to make the selection: A certain frequency of occurrence level? Another question 
to be answered is what shall be done if the capacity of the emergency forces, even on a 
regional basis, will not suffice? Will there be a dialogue with the plant owner to implement 
additional risk reducing measures at the source? In an early stage of land use planning 
adaptations are still possible but in already established situations there is less space for 
manoeuvre. Anyhow, time resolved answers for close-in to the source will increase the 
models performance requirement. 
 
There is also a tendency to go to fixed routes in which transportation of hazardous 
substances is channelled, with the idea that the risks over the trajectory can be analysed and 
better controlled. As a result some identified real vulnerable spots of e.g. higher collision 
probability or larger population density can be removed. In addition where necessary on 
e.g. certain parts of highway emergency response stations can be installed (Fabiano, 2005). 
This will require investments in safety and the question how safe is safe enough will of 
course be asked again.  
 
To get rid of spread in risk analysis results by prescribing (by law) the use of one particular 
model, in one particular version with a particular set of model options (SAFETI-NL), Uijt de 
Haag, 2007 is from a juridical point of view favourable but scientifically unsatisfactory. User 
influence on the results is this way minimised, but the reality content becomes questionable. 
It prevents QRA to be used where it should contribute most namely for making operations 
safer because influence of additional protective measures and of management quality is not 
included. This holds too for human error of which we have seen the significance. 
Adaptation to non-standard conditions and to hazardous materials with properties that 
differ strongly from common ones is in principle not possible. The approach may therefore 
discourage incentives to improve. Instead use shall be made of better knowledge, progress 
in IT and computer technology.  
 
Much has already been written about uncertainty in risk analysis. Paté-Cornell, 1996 
presented an overview. Main division is in aleatory uncertainty by variability of a known 
quantity as a result of randomness, and epistemic uncertainty which stems from lack of 
knowledge on e.g. mechanisms. The first can be treated by objective, classical statistics, the 
second only by a Bayesian approach of probability as belief (subjectivity) and can include 
beside classical statistical information other evidence such as expert opinion. Aggregation of 
the latter in to a distribution is a challenge; there are many hooks and eyes. The classical 
treatment provides the use of confidence intervals (the selection of which is the only subjective 
element), but most analysts suffice to produce a mean and unfortunately do not bother with 
confidence intervals. Reliability engineering methods to determine failure rates from 
observed failure times and the corresponding confidence interval are standard (see Red 
Book, Coloured Books, 2005). The use of the interval is emphasized in Modarres, 2006. 
The physical release models of the hazardous materials are embedded in a software 
program. For a reliable and reproducible answer the program shall be transparent, verifiable 
and robust. It means it shall be more than just a black-box. Insight in model assumptions 
and limitations, which inputs and equations are used where etc. shall be easily obtained. 
Verifiable means sources of input values shall be traceable, as also the choices made and the 
reasons why. Robustness has to do with reproducibility. The outcome shall not be 
dependent on the team performing the calculation. Reliability of software forms a sector of 
science in itself. In the early ’90-ties there has been an EU initiative by the CEC Model 
Evaluation Group in the field of industrial safety. For heavy gas dispersion this started with 
a comparison by Brighton, Mercer et al., 1994 of computer codes for instantaneous releases, 
which earlier had been validated against experiments. Differences in prediction ranged 
between a factor 3-5. This was followed by the development of an evaluation protocol 
(Duijm, 1997) and a survey of test data sets and resulted in project SMEDIS (Scientific Model 
Evaluation of Dense Gas Dispersion Models) lead by HSE, U.K. The protocol distinguished 
a number of steps of which the main are: assessment of the model with respect to the 
physics describing the phenomena including aerosols, terrain features – slopes, valleys- and 
obstacles, verification of its translation in algorithms in the software in the code and 
validation of the results against test data sets. An example applied on the model PHAST is 
given in DNV, 2002.  
 
Recently HSE, UK and NFPA in US together assigned Health and Safety Laboratory in UK 
to apply the SMEDIS protocol on specific LNG dispersion models, see NFPA59A, 2009. For 
the same reason as in risk calculations spread in model outcomes of LNG vapour dispersion 
will result in discussion on the size of the exclusion zone around LNG terminal facilities. 
With the newer developments in CFD and the refinement and improved flexibility of codes 
the protocol should be applied more extensively to release models in general. It must be 
remarked that notwithstanding the development and improvement of CFD explosion 
models, predictions from theses codes in complex offshore and onshore facility geometries 
appear to lie within a factor of 2 of the experimental data (Bull, 2004). Improving and 
refining human body response models to damaging threats are also needed. 
 
New activities in risk assessments are both methodological and in application. 
Methodological is beside the improvements already mentioned above, the introduction of 
Bayesian approach in statistics. Scenario identification and overview of cause-consequence 
chain possibilities was already facilitated much by applying the bow tie structure of a 
combined fault and event tree tied together at the critical event node (ARAMIS project). 
Also showing the preventive and protective barriers in such directed graph diagrams 
appears to be very helpful. However, Bayesian Belief Networks can bring larger freedom 
and flexibility to depict scenario structure while retaining quantification. In case chance and 
deterministic nodes of a belief net are extended with decision and value nodes to an 
Influence Diagram it can develop into a self-contained decision making tool.  
 
As already mentioned the Health and Safety Excutive in the UK, (see H.S.E., 2010) develops 
an effort to improve data on failure rates of on-shore process equipment the way they did 
before for off-shore installation components. Other initiatives such as the one by the Center 
for Chemical Process Safety in the US are collecting industry contributions based on their 
experience. Although these data will be proprietary spin-off has to be expected. 
www.intechopen.com
Trends, problems and outlook in process industry risk  
assessment and aspects of personal and process safety management 83
evolution of the scenario. Moreover the development of the threat in time and space 
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validation of the results against test data sets. An example applied on the model PHAST is 
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appear to lie within a factor of 2 of the experimental data (Bull, 2004). Improving and 
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Bayesian approach in statistics. Scenario identification and overview of cause-consequence 
chain possibilities was already facilitated much by applying the bow tie structure of a 
combined fault and event tree tied together at the critical event node (ARAMIS project). 
Also showing the preventive and protective barriers in such directed graph diagrams 
appears to be very helpful. However, Bayesian Belief Networks can bring larger freedom 
and flexibility to depict scenario structure while retaining quantification. In case chance and 
deterministic nodes of a belief net are extended with decision and value nodes to an 
Influence Diagram it can develop into a self-contained decision making tool.  
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Human factor influences have been object of much study but to make the available 
information practical applicable for risk assessments for process industry requires further 
effort. Operator error probabilities have been studied in depth in connection with nuclear 
safety. Most known for prediction of human performance reliability is THERP, Technique 
for Human Error Rate Prediction, see Swain and Guttmann, 1983 and Dougherty and 
Fragola, 1988. The European Process Safety Centre has coordinated the European Union 
PRISM project about which reports have been presented at the 11th International 
Symposium on Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in Prague in 2004. Management has a 
strong influence on frequency of human error in operation and maintenance, but it is 
virtually impossible to model. Latent failures and conditions such as wrong design, wrong 
planning decisions, time and cost pressure, and extreme climatic conditions are even more 
difficult to account for. It makes sense that usually for risk analysis best practice conditions 
for failure rates are assumed and effects of human factors in operation are disregarded 
wherever possible. Yet some modelling attempts have been published. The ARAMIS project 
has given the influence of quality of organisation and the Human factor a great deal of 
attention. In the first place Guldenmund et al., 2006 developed an auditing technique to 
assess the quality of safety barriers in a plant. Underlying are models for the plant’s safety 
management system (SMS), the barrier, and what they called ‘recursivity’. Seven SMS 
‘delivery systems’ are distinguished. Barriers have a broader notion than just protection 
layers. 11 Different types of barriers are distinguished. ‘Recursivity’, freely interpreted, 
refers to the cultural phenomenon that values and attitude of the top percolate down 
through the organization and reflect in the reliability of the barriers. Given the conceptual 
structure the auditing is on itself straight forward and all the delivery systems rated on 5-
point scale producing a nominal value between 0 and 1. As a last step the audit results are 
quantified to an M-index for each barrier type, which is the effect of actual management 
performance normalized on top performance, hence M ranges between 1 and 0. The 11 
barrier types are weighted by their influence on the barriers and summed over the seven 
delivery systems according to the following formula: 
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where Di  corresponds to the ratings of the seven delivery systems and  Bi,k  is a matrix 
consisting of barrier types (k = 1, 2, . . ., 11) distinguished by delivery system influence (i = 1, 
2, . . ., 7) and containing the weights. The M-value is applied as a correction factor and is 
assumed to have an exponential effect, hence is multiplied with the negative of the 10-based 
logarithm of the design probability of failure on demand of an equipment component, PFD:  
 
 ])log([10 MPFDactualPFD   (6) 
 
If management performs ideally M = 1 and PFDactual is PFD, if management is in total neglect 
M = 0 and PFDactual = 1. Subsequently, Duijm and Goossens, 2006 derived weight factors for 
the 7 management ‘delivery systems’ on the 11 types of barriers. Design values for reliability 
are a departure point. For most barriers even the worst management will not reduce 
reliability to zero, while for some barriers reliability may go to zero also under excellent 
management as a result of design and conditions. The approach allows this result to occur. 
As already mentioned above the effect on reliability is assumed to be exponential, which is a 
matter to be further considered. Other approaches assume a linear relation. For a first set of 
values of weight factors, use was made of databases. The nuclear industry NARA database 
(Kirwan et al., 2004) was used to estimate the effect of error producing conditions on 
behavioural barriers. In addition the PRIMA tool (Hurst et al., 1996) developed in work for 
UK HSE in early 90s to account for the effect of management quality determined by auditing 
on hardware failure rates. The latter regarded only pipe work failures in process plant. It 
further involved applying Bayes’ theorem to relate cause and management influence to the 
accident rate as shown in Eq. (7). The probability of failure A given a deficiency in 
management delivery system i of weight Bi is P(ABi), while this probability given absence of 
a deficiency is P(ABi), so that the quotient of the two yields Mi the management influence. 
According to Bayes’ theorem holds: 
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And therefore, because P(Bi)  = 1  P(Bi), the quotient can be obtained as: 
 
  
 
PP( ) 1 P( )
P( ) P( )1 P
ii i
i ii
B AA B B
A B BB A
   
 (8) 
 
Another attempt has been by Hochheimer et al., 2006 in which the human factor 
contribution in all components over the entire life cycle of a plant was identified and by 
different questionnaires safety management procedures, management quality and safety 
culture were rated. It is clear that these approaches need further development to become 
practical.  
 
To present results of risk analysis more convincingly and more refined improved 
Information Technology offers new possibilities. Wiersma et al., 2007 showed e.g. how with 
colours group risk results as function of cell location can be shown on a map output of a GIS 
(Geographical Information System) in which population density is embedded. The 
technique will help to find solutions in case at certain spots acceptance criteria cannot be 
met and population density, hazardous substance transport or storage has to be reduced or 
distance to the risk source be enlarged.  
 
Sustainable society and reduction of carbon dioxide emissions will bring a shift in the type 
of fuels, or perhaps better worded, energy carriers used. The fraction of less carbon 
containing fuels such as natural gas and hydrogen will grow at the cost of the traditional 
ones such as gasoline. Both methane and hydrogen, although representing extremes in their 
gas explosion properties, the first as the least reactive and the last as the most, will be 
comparable in risk of explosion and fire when it comes to large scale storage and 
distribution plants. Storage of these fuels at large scale has to be under pressure or liquefied 
when it becomes really massive. Apart from paying attention to security and guarding 
against risks by acts with bad intent QRA will need to be carried out for land use planning 
and licensing of facilities. For LNG there is a need of larger scale tests to study the 
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‘delivery systems’ are distinguished. Barriers have a broader notion than just protection 
layers. 11 Different types of barriers are distinguished. ‘Recursivity’, freely interpreted, 
refers to the cultural phenomenon that values and attitude of the top percolate down 
through the organization and reflect in the reliability of the barriers. Given the conceptual 
structure the auditing is on itself straight forward and all the delivery systems rated on 5-
point scale producing a nominal value between 0 and 1. As a last step the audit results are 
quantified to an M-index for each barrier type, which is the effect of actual management 
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barrier types are weighted by their influence on the barriers and summed over the seven 
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behavioural barriers. In addition the PRIMA tool (Hurst et al., 1996) developed in work for 
UK HSE in early 90s to account for the effect of management quality determined by auditing 
on hardware failure rates. The latter regarded only pipe work failures in process plant. It 
further involved applying Bayes’ theorem to relate cause and management influence to the 
accident rate as shown in Eq. (7). The probability of failure A given a deficiency in 
management delivery system i of weight Bi is P(ABi), while this probability given absence of 
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Another attempt has been by Hochheimer et al., 2006 in which the human factor 
contribution in all components over the entire life cycle of a plant was identified and by 
different questionnaires safety management procedures, management quality and safety 
culture were rated. It is clear that these approaches need further development to become 
practical.  
 
To present results of risk analysis more convincingly and more refined improved 
Information Technology offers new possibilities. Wiersma et al., 2007 showed e.g. how with 
colours group risk results as function of cell location can be shown on a map output of a GIS 
(Geographical Information System) in which population density is embedded. The 
technique will help to find solutions in case at certain spots acceptance criteria cannot be 
met and population density, hazardous substance transport or storage has to be reduced or 
distance to the risk source be enlarged.  
 
Sustainable society and reduction of carbon dioxide emissions will bring a shift in the type 
of fuels, or perhaps better worded, energy carriers used. The fraction of less carbon 
containing fuels such as natural gas and hydrogen will grow at the cost of the traditional 
ones such as gasoline. Both methane and hydrogen, although representing extremes in their 
gas explosion properties, the first as the least reactive and the last as the most, will be 
comparable in risk of explosion and fire when it comes to large scale storage and 
distribution plants. Storage of these fuels at large scale has to be under pressure or liquefied 
when it becomes really massive. Apart from paying attention to security and guarding 
against risks by acts with bad intent QRA will need to be carried out for land use planning 
and licensing of facilities. For LNG there is a need of larger scale tests to study the 
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phenomena at release, Koopman and Ermak, 2007. This was confirmed by various 
contributors to 2nd AIChE/CSChE LNG Topical Conference, “Answering Safe-Siting 
Questions for LNG Import Terminals” during the 8th World Congress on Chemical 
Engineering in Montreal, Canada in August 2009. On the various aspects of evaporation by 
a spill on water, the dispersion of cloud and the thermal effects of a burning cloud there 
exist considerable uncertainties. Hydrogen is a potential energy carrier replacing gasoline 
and serving as a fuel for fuel cells. It can be stored under pressure, as a cryogen or absorbed 
on e.g. a metal substrate. For the time being the pressurized mode is most practicable. Large 
scale distribution and use will introduce risks with this highly flammable material which 
has properties differing considerably from hydrocarbons. Various organizations such as the 
International Energy Agency and the European HySafe in the 6th Framework Program 
sponsored risk assessment studies. In 2009 results were presented at the Third International 
Conference on Hydrogen Safety took place in Ajaccio, Corsica France. Another aspect of 
sustainability is removal of carbon dioxide from flue gases and sequestration, CCS or carbon 
capture and storage. Carbon dioxide above concentrations of a few percent is toxic; it 
induces first drowsiness and unconsciousness, while above 10% depending on exposure 
time it will be lethal. Sequestration in cavities in the underground on land introduces the 
risk of spills in transport, during compressing operation and from the well. Because it is a 
heavy gas, dispersion has to be modelled if the release can be close to inhabited areas or 
traffic nodes. Low wind speed and sloping terrain will make that a cloud at higher 
concentration can travel considerable distance before being diluted. A complication is the 
release at pressures above critical, because under expansion part of the carbon-dioxide will 
solidify and sublimate again once at atmospheric conditions. 
 
Finally, improvement can be made in decision making processes on the basis of risk 
assessments. For this distinction has to be made between decision making for public safety 
and in case of optimum investment strategy from a cost-benefit point a view in business, see 
also Pasman et al., 2009 and Prem et al., 2010.  
 
8. Conclusions and Recommendation 
A data base study on the downstream oil process industry revealed that the total number of 
accidents in the world on average is still on the increase. The annual fluctuations are large. 
Further decreases the number of fatalities but the number of injured persons grows. An 
analysis was made of the main cause categories used in the EU MARS reporting system: 
Process/plant, Organization and Environment which decreased in contribution in this 
order. It was further tried to delve deeper into the cause-consequence chains. The largest 
contributor to Process/plant is failing integrity of reactors, vessels and equipment, whereas 
for Organization it appears that 50% is due to worker error. It was tried to find out which 
category produced relatively the highest fraction of fatalities. In that respect the number in 
the category Process/plant is slightly higher than in Organization. By analyzing near misses 
over a prolonged period the top fifteen root causes in an oil company were found. Top of 
the list was component failure.  
Subsequently, human factor was further analyzed and it was found that more intense 
training and experience on the job had a reducing effect on the number of injuries sustained. 
When considering process risks it is essential not to neglect human error. 
History shows a growing use of risk assessment applied to process industry. There is 
however also growing criticism with respect to the large spread in results when different 
teams do an assessment on a same object. This is due for a large part to differences in details 
of scenario generation, incompleteness and inaccuracies in models (source terms, dispersion 
models) and data (failure rates and ignition probabilities). For legal use in land use planning 
and licensing standardization is a way out but for making a plant safer or for emergency 
planning realism is more important.  
 
Concluding it can be stated that we shall not give up reducing uncertainty in risk analysis. 
Most difficult but most important will be scenario development to include sufficient detail 
realism on human error, management quality, possible escalation and domino effects. New 
modelling techniques such as Bayesian Networks may help. Consequence models can be 
improved. CFD refinement is there now. There are a number of tools to scrutinise existing 
models better. The idea of SMEDIS can be extended over a wider range of models. Further 
(field) tests can help to fill knowledge gaps. Effort on human body response shall be 
increased. The scientific community should make a plea to top management and 
governments that much resource is wasted in fighting each other over fuzzy analysis results 
if investment in further knowledge development stays behind. ETPIS (http:// 
www.industrialsafety-tp.org) is a platform to carry this message to the European 
Commission in Brussels. 
 
Next is the problem of the formulation of criteria for decision making, which shows a 
national diversity in Europe with respect to public safety, which hampers comparison and a 
more uniform regulation. A European Working Group on Land Use Planning tries to 
improve the situation. 
 
Finally, it was tried to give a perspective of promising developments in methodology and of 
applications required by the change in energy sources for reasons of sustainability. 
Cooperative efforts on e.g. a European scale are highly needed to give relief to the larger 
demands in a more complex and economically striving society which puts a high value to 
overall safety and security. 
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for Organization it appears that 50% is due to worker error. It was tried to find out which 
category produced relatively the highest fraction of fatalities. In that respect the number in 
the category Process/plant is slightly higher than in Organization. By analyzing near misses 
over a prolonged period the top fifteen root causes in an oil company were found. Top of 
the list was component failure.  
Subsequently, human factor was further analyzed and it was found that more intense 
training and experience on the job had a reducing effect on the number of injuries sustained. 
When considering process risks it is essential not to neglect human error. 
History shows a growing use of risk assessment applied to process industry. There is 
however also growing criticism with respect to the large spread in results when different 
teams do an assessment on a same object. This is due for a large part to differences in details 
of scenario generation, incompleteness and inaccuracies in models (source terms, dispersion 
models) and data (failure rates and ignition probabilities). For legal use in land use planning 
and licensing standardization is a way out but for making a plant safer or for emergency 
planning realism is more important.  
 
Concluding it can be stated that we shall not give up reducing uncertainty in risk analysis. 
Most difficult but most important will be scenario development to include sufficient detail 
realism on human error, management quality, possible escalation and domino effects. New 
modelling techniques such as Bayesian Networks may help. Consequence models can be 
improved. CFD refinement is there now. There are a number of tools to scrutinise existing 
models better. The idea of SMEDIS can be extended over a wider range of models. Further 
(field) tests can help to fill knowledge gaps. Effort on human body response shall be 
increased. The scientific community should make a plea to top management and 
governments that much resource is wasted in fighting each other over fuzzy analysis results 
if investment in further knowledge development stays behind. ETPIS (http:// 
www.industrialsafety-tp.org) is a platform to carry this message to the European 
Commission in Brussels. 
 
Next is the problem of the formulation of criteria for decision making, which shows a 
national diversity in Europe with respect to public safety, which hampers comparison and a 
more uniform regulation. A European Working Group on Land Use Planning tries to 
improve the situation. 
 
Finally, it was tried to give a perspective of promising developments in methodology and of 
applications required by the change in energy sources for reasons of sustainability. 
Cooperative efforts on e.g. a European scale are highly needed to give relief to the larger 
demands in a more complex and economically striving society which puts a high value to 
overall safety and security. 
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